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INTRODUCTION  
Can States Parties interpret the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (“CRC” or “Convention”)1 as creating obligations on 
prospective parents with respect to their prospective children, and 
 
∗Westerfield Fellow/Assistant Professor, Loyola University New Orleans, College 
of Law. Sincere thanks to Philip Alston, Paula Abrams, David Archard, Eugeen 
Verhellen, Laura Purdy, Mitch Crusto, Alexandra Freidberg, and Carol Pauli for 
their help and advice. Special thanks to Kate Fletcher for her wonderful research 
assistance and comments. All views expressed are my own. 
 1. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Sep. 2, 1990, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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implement the Convention so as to alter domestic norms regarding 
the right to procreate? The CRC sets forth rights-based rules and 
standards for the protection and furtherance of children’s interests, 
and states objective norms regarding how children should be treated 
and the conditions in which they should live, which must be 
implemented by states parties. It thus seeks to change the 
circumstances in which children are and will be living.  
Although, at a very basic level, a child’s circumstances depend 
upon the circumstances of its procreation, subject matter experts who 
write about the CRC do not seem to have considered whether a state 
party might partially fulfill its obligations by placing legal 
obligations on prospective parents—influencing not just a child’s 
environment, but also the act of procreation by which that child 
enters into its environment. For example, Thomas Hammarberg, in 
his article The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child—and How 
to Make it Work, never mentions the relationship between 
prospective parents and their future children, but instead focuses 
exclusively on the relatively static world of extant children and their 
rights.2 A. Glenn Mower Jr. notes the threat that population growth 
poses to the type of economic and social development called for by 
the Convention.3 In searching for a solution, Mower focuses largely 
on the Convention’s call for increasing education rates and the 
probable decline in fertility that will result.4 He does not consider 
that a state’s obligation to protect and provide for children5 might be 
read to require parents to forgo procreating if they cannot meet their 
parental obligations—a requirement which would more directly 
affect population growth and development.6 Eugeen Verhellen 
discusses in depth current strategies to implement the Convention.7 
 
 2. See generally Thomas Hammarberg, The U.N. Convention on the Rights of 
the Child – and How to Make it Work, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 97 (1990). 
 3. See A. GLENN MOWER, JR., THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE 
CHILD 7 (2007) (arguing that a “positive correlation” exists between education, 
population control). 
 4. Id. 
 5. For the limited purposes of this article I will assume that the CRC is not a 
self-executing treaty and that states will have to implement it via domestic 
legislation. See infra Part II.A (discussing the triangular relationship between 
children, their parents, and the state). 
 6. See infra Part II.B.4 (examining the nature and effects of Chinese family 
planning processes). 
 7. See EUGEEN VERHELLEN, CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 30-
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None involve an application of the Convention’s standards that is 
based on the moral and legal relationship between prospective 
parents and their future children.  
It is not a new notion that prospective parents might have concrete 
moral obligations to their prospective children. As discussed in Part 
I.B, various ethicists have made such a claim. David Archard, 
following in the tradition of Joel Feinberg and what he called every 
child’s right to an “open future,”8 has even taken the argument so far 
as to use the CRC’s standards as a threshold that prospective parents 
should meet before having their children:  
[T]he minimum threshold entitlement of any child is the 
secure enjoyment of a good number of those rights that are 
listed in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. This is every child’s birthright. A parent does wrong in 
knowingly bringing into existence a child who will not enjoy 
most of these rights. Acting in this wrongful way she does not 
exercise a procreative liberty right since that right is 
internally constrained by the obligation to ensure that any 
child will be guaranteed at the least the adequate life which 
these rights circumscribe.9  
Archard is, however, primarily focused on the ethics and morality 
of such a threshold and therefore does not discuss the content of the 
Convention.10 Similarly, Archard does not consider whether the 
Convention might alter our legal obligations in having children.11 
 
36 (2d ed. 1997) (identifying “child-advocacy,” the study of the child, children’s 
self-organization, and the development of networks as four key strategies of the 
children’s rights movement). 
 8. See JOEL FEINBERG, THE RIGHTS OF ANIMALS AND UNBORN GENERATIONS, 
IN PHILOSOPHICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS (1974), reprinted in RIGHTS, 
JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 67, 179 (1980) (quoting Coke as stating 
that “[t]he law in many cases hath consideration of him in respect of the apparent 
expectation of his birth”). Feinberg went on to ask, “Why then deny that the human 
beings of the future have rights which can be claimed against us now in their 
behalf?” Id. at 181; see also Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Creating Children with 
Disabilities: Parental Tort Liability for Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 60 
HASTINGS L.J. 299 (2008) (using Feinberg’s right to an “open future” to justify tort 
liability in the context of assisted reproductive technologies). 
 9. David Archard, Wrongful Life, 79 PHIL. 403, 420 (2004). 
 10. See id. at 406 (briefly noting that the CRC establishes a “useful” but not 
exhaustive list of rights to which children are entitled). 
 11. See generally id. (presenting a purely normative, and not legal, argument). 
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Regardless, his point raises the question of whether states parties can 
ever comply with their treaty obligations without considering the 
legal interests of future children, and their relation to the procreative 
rights of their prospective parents. Indeed, I argue that the 
Convention begins to look absurd if we do not read it as limiting the 
right to procreate. 
Today, millions of children are born into conditions that do not 
meet the CRC’s objective standards. According to Japp Doek, former 
Chairperson of the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the 
Child, “the world is not yet a place fit for far too many children.”12 
The CRC, in part, calls for a world in which all children are able to 
exercise their rights to the highest attainable standards of health, 
education, and social security; to a standard of living adequate for 
development; to freedom from work and soldiering; and to enjoy 
rest, leisure, and play.13 This world offers a stark contrast to the 
reality of many children now and in the foreseeable future:  
600 million children have to live, that is to be fed, clothed, 
housed, and educated with less than $1 US per day; even in 
the richest countries of the world one in every six children 
(about 47 million) live under the national poverty line; 211 
million children aged 5-14 are engaged in some form of 
economic activity, and 186 million of them are engaged in 
the worst forms of child labor with the same applying for 
almost 60 million children age 15-17 years; about 110 million 
of those working children of primary education age do not 
receive any education at all; about 11 million children die 
every year of preventable diseases, that is about 20,000 per 
day, a fact that goes without any media attention; at the end 
of 2001, there were 2.7 million children under 15 years living 
with HIV/AIDS; in that year, 800,000 children under 15 
years were newly infected with HIV and 580,000 children of 
that age group died of AIDS; the number of African children 
who had lost their mother or both parents by the end of 2000 
is estimated at 12.1 million and is forecast to more than 
double  over  the  next  decade;  .  .  .  in  the  past decade two 
 
 
 12. Jaap E. Doek, The Protection of Children’s Rights and the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child: Achievements and Challenges, 22 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 235, 247 (2003). 
 13. See infra Part II.A. 
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million children died as a direct result of armed conflicts and 
an additional six million were injured or disabled.14  
Much of this is addressed by the United Nations Millennium 
Development Goals’ (“MDGs”) eight benchmarks of development 
that target extreme poverty and illness.15 But these goals cannot be 
ensured without attention to the very behavior that brings children 
into the world. Former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated 
that “the Millennium Development Goals, particularly the 
eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, cannot be achieved if 
questions of population and reproductive health are not squarely 
addressed.”16 According to a recent U.N. report, “[p]opulation is at 
the core of development, and population trends are a key element of 
the context in which development takes place. Consequently, 
measures directed towards influencing demographic behaviour and 
population dynamics . . . contribute significantly to the achievement 
of universally agreed development goals, including [the MDGs].”17 
A recent article in the San Francisco Chronicle covered the story 
of Afghanistan’s unusually high fertility rate, which is the highest in 
Asia.18 At the current rate of growth, Afghanistan’s population will 
 
 14. Doek, supra note 12, at 247-48 (footnote omitted); see also Jaap E. Doek, 
The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child: Some Observations on the 
Monitoring and the Social Context of Its Implementation, 14 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. 
POL'Y 125, 131-32 (2003) (observing that socioeconomic conditions prevent many 
children from enjoying the rights articulated in the CRC). 
 15. United Nations Millennium Development Goals, 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (listing gender 
equality, child and maternal health, environmental sustainability, and global 
partnership among the Millennium Development Goals). 
 16. Press Release, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council Comm. for Asia & the Pac., 
Region Cannot Confront Challenges Effectively Without Addressing Population 
and Reproductive Health, U.N. Doc. G/40/2002 (Dec.16, 2002). 
 17. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFF., POPULATION CHALLENGES AND 
DEVELOPMENT GOALS 55 (2005); see also DAVID BLOOM ET AL., THE 
DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDEND: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON THE ECONOMIC 
CONSEQUENCES OF POPULATION CHANGE (2003) (arguing that reducing high 
fertility can create opportunities for economic growth when combined with 
specific educational, health, and labor-market policies). The demographic 
dividend, which is a recognized and accurate model in welfare economics, rests 
largely on the ratio of productive adults to dependent children, but depends on key 
variables such as education and public health. BLOOM ET AL., supra, at xiii. 
 18. See James Palmer, Afghans Torn Over Family Size, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 14, 
2008, at A15 (“About 800,000 people annually are added to the nation’s 
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close to double by 2050.19 Research attributes Afghanistan’s rampant 
poverty (forty-two percent of Afghans live below the poverty line) 
and high infant mortality rates largely to these high fertility rates.20 
Moreover many of the Afghanis interviewed will continue to have as 
many children as possible, primarily because they are needed for 
labor, but also because “[m]ost of the people here believe the number 
of children they have is dependent on God’s will.”21  
Afghanistan ratified the CRC in 1994.22 Here, then, is the 
embodiment of Archard’s dilemma: Are States Parties, like 
Afghanistan, obligated under the CRC to alter their citizens’ 
perception of the duties they owe their prospective children when 
choosing to procreate?  
This article examines the CRC to determine whether it provides a 
reason for states to pursue policies that alter prospective parents’ 
perceptions of the duties they owe their prospective children—a 
reason states may be legally bound to confront. Part II introduces a 
new framework for interpreting the CRC that takes a child-centered 
perspective, but one with a specific focus on the value of potentiality 
and on the interests of prospective children. Part III then interprets 
the Convention in light of this framework to see whether it places 
legal obligations on prospective parents. Finally, Part IV takes up 
possible counterarguments to the claim that the CRC can limit a 
prospective parent’s right to procreate. 
If placing duties on prospective parents seems odd, it should be 
remembered that children’s rights were once themselves an oddity. 
John Eekelaar finds that children’s interests’ trumping their parents’ 
interests represents a “total reversal” from a history in which 
children’s interests were made subservient to those of adults.23 If we 
have yet to elevate prospective children’s rights over those of would-
 
population . . . .”). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. (remarking that Afghanistan’s infant mortality rate is 123 times that of 
the United States). 
 21. Id. 
 22. The Secretary-General, CRC: Afghanistan: Notification, 
C.N.322.1995.TREATIES-7 (Depositary Notification) (Nov. 7, 2002), available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapt 
er=4&lang=en#EndDec. 
 23. John Eekelaar, The Emergence of Children’s Rights, 6 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 161, 172 (1986). 
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be parents, it may not be for any truly principled reasons. Given how 
small the number of existing children is relative to the number of 
future children, reading the CRC to ignore those future children is 
regressive, almost myopically static, and as described at length 
below, contrary to a true child-centered perspective.24 As Laura 
Purdy said, “It is unreasonable, in a world of limited resources and 
great need, to be required to allocate resources for those who didn’t 
have to need them.”25  
I. A NEW FRAMEWORK 
A. A CHILD-CENTERED PERSPECTIVE THAT ALSO ACCOUNTS FOR A 
CHILD’S POTENTIALITY  
To consider the CRC as an instrument which places duties on 
prospective parents, we must assess it from a new and unique 
perspective. As an initial matter, a child-centered perspective (or 
what Barbara Bennett Woodhouse calls a “generist perspective”),26 
does not simply apply an adult’s self-referential “best interest” 
standard, nor does it treat the child as an autonomous rights-holder.27 
Rather, it views children as normatively drawing forth, impelling 
only love and nurturing from all who deal with them. This is a 
meaningful standard that might call into question the propriety of 
creating children to serve as laborers, for example. It would require 
us, among other things, to forgo having children until we are in a 
position to care for them, despite our yearning to do so sooner. It 
 
 24. Infra Part I.A. 
 25. Laura M. Purdy, Loving Future People, in REPRODUCTION, ETHICS, AND 
THE LAW: FEMINIST PERSEPCTIVES 300, 313 (1995). Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes said this: “We learn that for everything we have to give up something else, 
and we are taught to set the advantage we gain against the other advantage we lose, 
and to know what we are doing when we elect.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path 
of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 474 (1897). The Convention calls upon all citizens 
of the States Parties to provide their resources and thus give up certain things to 
help fund the changes children deserve as their birthright. All have to forgo 
fulfilling certain interests to achieve the Convention’s goals. Are prospective 
parents among those to whom this applies? Once children have arrived in this 
world neither the parent nor the state can simply create a better life for the child 
than actual conditions permit. 
 26. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered 
Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1755 (1993). 
 27. See id. at 1755-57 (describing the generist perspective as a means to assist 
adults in making more legitimate decisions with respect to children). 
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rejects the older and competing perspective that by creating children 
we have benefited them enough.  
This perspective is consistent with accepted methods of reading 
the CRC. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (the “Committee”) has used as 
a guide in interpreting the CRC,28 states that “[a] treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of 
its object and purpose.”29 The Committee’s General Comment 
Number Five further lays out guiding principles for interpreting the 
CRC.30 These include Article 3(1)’s best interests of the child 
standard;31 as well as Article 6’s state party obligation to “ensure to 
the maximum extent possible the survival and development of the 
child.”32  
The generist perspective is consistent with the CRC obligation to 
ensure the best interests of the child, prioritizing his or her interests 
over those of adults. The perspective mirrors the CRC obligation to 
maximize childrens’ survival and development, that is, to make 
choices which produce the best outcome for childrens’ well-being. 
Consistent with these principles, the perspective entails reading the 
CRC to require policy shifts that result in the actual realization of 
childrens’ rights. It requires states to make interpretive and therefore 
policy decisions based on maximizing outcomes that are in 
children’s best interests. From this perspective, the end goal of the 
CRC is to prevent children from living in certain conditions or below 
 
 28. See General Comment No. 5, General Measures of Implementation for the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Committee on the Rights of the Child, ¶ 14, 
U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2003/5 (Nov. 27, 2003) [hereinafter General Comment No. 5] 
(using the definitions and various requirements under the Vienna Convention, infra 
note 29, as a guide in interpreting the CRC). 
 29. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679. 
 30. See General Comment No. 5, supra note 28, ¶ 12 (recognizing within 
Articles 2, 3(1), 6, and 12 of the CRC general principles to guide governments in 
implementing the Convention). 
 31. See Philip Alston, The Legal Framework of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, 91/2 BULL. HUM. RTS. 1, 7 (1992) (remarking that the best interest 
standard also appears elsewhere in the CRC, specifically with reference to 
separation of children from their families, childhood development, adoption, and 
chidlren’s interactions with police). 
 32. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1, art. 6(2). 
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a minimum threshold. For example, if we can interpret the treaty in a 
way that prevents children from living in the absence of food, 
healthcare, and education, it would be inconsistent with the child-
centered perspective to interpret the treaty so as to permit such 
circumstances to exist.  
Finally, we must insert an element of time into our child-centered 
perspective by taking into account a child’s life prospects.33 This 
means maximizing not just the interests of a given child at a static 
point in time, but acting so as to maximize the child’s life prospects. 
As children grow older, in the process of living their finite lives, they 
lose that potentiality. But as we move back in time in the direction of 
and even before their birth, their potentiality grows and with it our 
obligations to them because our actions become ever more 
influential. Children are rights-holders whose potential to enjoy those 
rights grows as we move in the direction of their birth and beyond. 
This slightly modified perspective is also consistent with the CRC. 
Prior to the CRC’s coming into force, children were already 
protected in various human rights instruments.34 Arguably, the CRC 
was necessary because children, as a class, are uniquely vulnerable in 
terms of their potentiality and therefore require special protection. 
Children need certain rights that adults do not, in part, because 
deprivation threatens a child’s potentiality, which it cannot do to an 
adult whose potentiality is more fixed. A child’s entire future well-
being can be determined by our behavior towards him or her.  
The fluid nature of a child’s potentiality is reflected in the greater 
emphasis that CRC jurisprudence places on younger children than on 
older ones, as evidenced by General Comment Number Seven, 
“Implementing Child Rights in Early Childhood.”35 Given that the 
 
 33. I believe this would be altering Bennett Woodhouse’s generist perspective. 
Presumably Woodhouse is referring primarily to extant children, though she also 
refers to John Rawls’ “generational” principle of the duties we owe future 
generations—specifically the principle that we must leave them more than we 
ourselves were given. See Woodhouse, supra note 26, at 1755. 
 34. See Adam Lopatka, An Introduction to the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, 6 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 251, 257 (1996) 
(identifying the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as the first legally 
binding global provisions protecting the rights of children). 
 35. General Comment No. 7, Implementing Child Rights in Early Childhood, 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/7/Rev.1, (Sept. 20, 
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Committee has only issued ten General Comments since its 
inception, it is significant that it chose to comment on the importance 
of state party obligations with regard to early childhood—though this 
is not a specific area of focus within the CRC. The Comment states 
that “[e]arly childhood is a critical period for realizing children’s 
rights,”36 based on several reasons, which can be reduced to a single 
claim: the circumstances of our early youth determine in large part 
the people we become.  
B. THEORIES OF OBLIGATIONS TO PROSPECTIVE CHILDREN  
Viewing the CRC from a child-centered perspective that accounts 
for potentiality pushes our focus away from adulthood back in the 
direction of birth. For example, it makes little sense to require 
secondary education to be free and compulsory, but not to require the 
same for primary education. Furthermore, following our purpose of 
promoting children’s welfare via the actual realization of their rights 
and the maximization of their outcomes, and taking into account 
their unique potentiality, we must consider how states parties and 
prospective parents’ decisions will affect future children.  
This may be a new approach for lawyers, but it is not for ethics 
and morality theorists. Lawyers have tended to lag far behind 
philosophers in considering duties to future generations in general 
and prospective children in particular. This is true even among 
human rights lawyers, who should be more in step with moral theory, 
on which human rights are primarily based. Philosophers have long 
provided moral frameworks that are consistent with and undergird 
our child potentiality centered perspective. Indeed, much of this 
discourse occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, when overpopulation 
made the rights and wrongs of having children a central policy 
concern.  
For example, Onora O’Neill has argued, 
the right to beget or bear is not unrestricted, but contingent 
upon begetters and bearers having or making some feasible 
plan for their child to be adequately reared by themselves or 
by willing others. Persons who beget or bear without making 
any such plans cannot claim that they are exercising a right. 
 
2006) [hereinafter General Comment No. 7]. 
 36. Id. ¶ 6. 
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A corollary of this claim is that some coercive population 
control policies do not usually violate persons’ rights to 
procreate . . . .37  
In the same piece, she referred to “a minimally adequate quality or 
standard of life” as the content of adequately rearing one’s children, 
and said that “[a] justifiable procreation decision must be one which 
is based on a feasible plan for any child which is born to have at least 
a minimally adequate standard of upbringing, however this is 
specified.”38 Not inconsistently, she now argues against attributing 
fundamental moral rights to children, tending instead to favor 
fundamental obligations on adults,39 though she finds talk of 
children’s rights politically and instrumentally valuable in creating 
parental obligations.40  
O’Neill’s earlier work was not unique in suggesting that we have 
duties to our prospective children. Michael Bayles, a contemporary, 
argued that, “[t]here is good reason for legislation to prevent the birth 
of persons who would lack substantial capacity to achieve or take 
advantage of a quality of life of level n or whose existence would 
decrease the number of people who might live with a quality of life 
at that level.”41 Bayles went on to talk about a possible index for the 
quality of life, but he did not lay out any specific standards.42 Later, 
Archard—as indicated in his reference to the CRC above43—writing 
years after O’Neill and Bayles, goes further toward filling in actual 
content, norms, or standards for the duty.  
Bonnie Steinbock offers what she calls a “holistic” view of the 
right to procreate, grounded in moral theory and international human 
rights instruments, and argues that “[t]he right to reproduce protects 
 
 37. Onora O'Neill, Begetting, Bearing, and Rearing, in HAVING CHILDREN: 
PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL REFLECTIONS ON PARENTHOOD 25, 25-26 (Onora 
O'Neill & William Ruddick eds., 1979). 
 38. Id. at 34. 
 39. See Onora O’Neill, Children’s Rights and Children’s Lives, in CHILDREN, 
RIGHTS, AND THE LAW 24, 25-26 (Phillip Alston et al. eds., 1992) (arguing that 
adults have an obligation not to abuse or molest children, to provide care to 
children, and to be “kind and considerate” toward children). 
 40. See id. at 39. 
 41. Michael Bayles, Harm to the Unconceived, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 292, 302 
(1976). 
 42. Id. at 301. 
 43. See Archard, supra note 9. 
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the interests individuals have in founding families. If this is the 
correct conception of the right to reproduce, then where there is no 
intention or ability to rear, there is no right to reproduce.”44 As such, 
“[t]here is no unlimited right to produce children whom one will beat 
or starve or kill.”45 Steinbock’s conception of the right also restricts 
prospective parents’ use of the class of prospective children, limiting 
their power to determine the fate of members of the class by creating 
a minimum threshold before one is permitted access.  
Some legal philosophers have made similar arguments, though it 
seems they have not gone much further than Archard in defining this 
duty. For example, Francis Kamm made the following point, albeit in 
the context of human cloning:  
I suggest that we might wrong people even if we create them 
to lives worth living according to this reasoning: (a) no one is 
harmed in not being created, because there is no one to be 
harmed if we do not create someone; hence, (b) we can set a 
high standard for permissibly creating people, demanding that 
creators create lives that are more than minimally 
satisfactory; and (c) if new people have a right to this, then 
we could violate their rights by creating them without 
meeting this standard; one way to avoid the violation is by 
not creating them.46 
In the context of assisted reproductive technologies, various legal 
arguments have been made for a “minimum threshold” of quality of 
life that must be met before we create a child. These include Ronald 
M. Green’s argument that the standard should be to ensure that 
children born are in parity with those in the child’s “birth cohort.”47 
 
 44. See Bonnie Steinbock, Rethinking the Right to Reproduce 23 (Harvard Ctr. 
for Population & Dev. Studies, Working Paper No. 98.05, 1998), available at 
http://search.sph.harvard.edu/search?ie=&site=HSPH_Homepage&output=xml_no
_dtd&client=HSPH_Homepage&lr=&proxystylesheet=HSPH_Homepage&oe=&q
=steinbock&sa.x=7&sa.y=10&sa=Google+Search (follow “Working Paper Series” 
link) (rejecting a view of the right to reproduce that stems from purely biological 
considerations). 
 45. Id. at 25. 
 46. Francis M. Kamm, Cloning and Harm to Offspring, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL'Y 65, 72 (2000) (footnote omitted). 
 47. See Ronald M. Green, Parental Autonomyc and the Obligation not to Harm 
One’s Child Genetircally, 25 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 5, 10 (1997); see also Carl H. 
Coleman, Conceiving Harm: Disability Discrimination in Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies, 50 UCLA L. REV. 17, 53 (2002) (citing Green for the same 
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Richard Storrow also argues that prospective fertility-treatment 
patients should be screened for fitness, i.e. for “competency to 
perform parental duties adequately.”48  
Further, in the context of nonconsensual reproduction, legal 
arguments have been made for the rights that could be afforded to the 
class of prospective children. Michael Goodhart has argued that 
children born of war rape and forced impregnation can and should be 
viewed as having had their human rights violated by their rapist-
fathers—that is, that they can meaningfully assert a claim of 
wrongful procreation against them.49  
A full exploration of the morality of procreating is beyond this 
article (and perhaps the capacity of the author), but I think it is safe 
at this point to claim that there is a theoretical basis in morality, and 
an evolving one in law, for holding prospective parents to obligations 
vis-à-vis their prospective children. The obvious question then is 
whether, as Achard suggests, the Convention might provide the 
content, norms, or standards for those obligations.  
Significantly, while it is theoretically possible to hold prospective 
parents to obligations vis-à-vis their prospective children, at least two 
strong moral counter-arguments should be noted. The first is based 
on an adaptation of Derek Parfit’s non-identity problem, which states 
that we cannot harm people in the act of creating them unless their 
lives are not worth living.50 The second is Laura Shanner’s argument 
that prospective children cannot assert a claim not to exist.51 
 
proposition). 
 48. Richard F. Storrow, The Bioethics of Prospective Parenthood: In Pursuit of 
the Proper Standard for Gatekeeping in Fertility Clinics, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2283, 2304 (2007). 
 49. See Michael Goodhart, Sins of the Fathers: War Rape, Wrongful 
Procreation, and Children's Human Rights, 6 J. HUM. RTS. 307, 309-310 (2007) 
(noting that it is necessary to give children born of war rape and forced 
impregnation their own rights in order to ensure that the focus is not only on the 
mothers as rape victims, but also on the children). 
 50. See JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 76 (1994) (citing Derek Parfit, On Doing the Best 
for Our Children, in ETHICS AND POPULATION (Michael D. Bayles ed. 1976). Parfit 
argues that a particular child born with a handicap is not harmed merely by being 
born to a mother who knew ahead of time that that child had no chance of being 
normal. See Robertson, supra, at 76. 
 51. See Laura Shanner, The Right to Procreate: When Rights Claims Have 
Gone Wrong, 40 MCGILL L.J. 823, 844 (1995). 
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Archard, O’Neill, Bayles, and Kamm address these types of 
arguments in formulating their claims above. Others take less 
deontological and more consequentialist or utilitarian approaches to 
overcome these counter-arguments.52 Parfit tended towards the “no 
difference” view that procreating a child into harmful circumstances 
is no different from inflicting harmful circumstances on a child who 
is already alive.53 
We can answer the first counterargument by saying that we do not 
run afoul of the non-identity problem if the obligation of parents to 
children is beneficence (as some of the theorists discussed above 
suggest and as I will argue below), as opposed to the obligation not 
to harm. For, even if we normally cannot harm a person in the act of 
creating them, we can certainly fail to be beneficent in doing so. As 
to the second counterargument, Bayles deals effectively with 
Shanner’s point that a non-entity cannot claim non-existence by 
treating prospective children not as individuals but as a class of 
persons: 
Liberty-limiting laws which protect the well-being of 
unconceived persons must be supported by a principle other 
than that of private harm. In general, the conditions for the 
application of the harm principle are not met in situations 
involving the well-being of the unconceived. First, the 
condition of an individual person is in fact met only after 
conception brings about the person’s existence. Second, even 
when the condition of an individual person is met, in 
important cases that person is not harmed, Consequently, an 
acceptable   principle   must   involve  (1)  classes  of  persons 
 
 
 52. See generally TIM MULGAN, FUTURE PEOPLE: A MODEST 
CONSEQUENTIALIST ACCOUNT OF OUR OBLIGATIONS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 9, 
13, 16-17 (2006). Mulgan describes various approaches to determining the 
morality of creating others, including consequentialist and Kantian, and person-
affecting approaches. Person-affecting approaches typically define harm by 
comparing possible outcomes of a person’s actions to a particular baseline; 
consider wronging someone to be separate from harming them; treat prospective 
children as part of a class; or base the desireablity of various outcomes on harm to 
persons other than the prospective child. Id. 
 53. See Dan W. Brock, Procreative Liberty, 74 TEX. L. REV. 187, 203 (1995) 
(book review); see also MULGAN, supra note 52, at 20-21 (explaining Parfit’s “no 
difference” principle and contrasting it with the person-affecting principle, which 
contemplates a difference between the wrongs committed). 
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rather than individual ones and (2) choices between good or 
positive qualities of life.54 
Again, this approach is entirely consistent with the CRC because 
the CRC also treats children as a class of persons.55 The CRC 
guarantees an individual child health care and education not because 
of who he is, but because he is part of a larger class of persons called 
children. In one sense, the CRC does nothing more than designate 
children as a protected class and specifies the minimum conditions in 
which they should live. 
C. ARTICULATING A PRINCIPLE OF PROSPECTIVE PARENTAL 
OBLIGATION  
When looking for the actual standards in the CRC that might 
define or provide content for the minimum quality of life owed to 
children, we can focus on only those rights that we can reasonably 
assume will affect the vast majority of children. For example, 
children have a CRC right to procedural due process,56 but there is no 
guarantee that a child will come into contact with the judicial system. 
In contrast, the right to “the highest attainable standard of health,” or 
the right to a “standard of living adequate for the child’s . . . 
development” foreseeably affects most extant and future children.57 
Therefore, for purposes of this article, I will focus on what Eekelaar 
calls “basic” interests (general physical, emotional, and intellectual 
care) and “developmental” interests (ensuring the development of the 
child’s capacities to the best advantage),58 or what Hammarberg calls 
“provision” (“the right to get one’s basic needs fulfilled—for 
 
 54. Bayles, supra note 41, at 300.  
 55. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1, art. 1 (“[C]hild 
means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law 
applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.”); accord General Comment 
No. 7, supra note 35, ¶ 13(b). The title of the comment’s section is “Best interests 
of young children as a group or constituency.” Id. (emphasis added). In contrast, 
the section directly before refers to “Best interests of individual children.” Id. ¶ 
13(a). It speaks in terms of “decision-making” by those responsible for children 
and states’ obligations regarding legal proceedings; the latter section, using the 
language of “group or constituency,” refers to “All law and policy development[s] 
. . . that affect children.” Id. ¶¶ 13(a)-(b). 
 56. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1, art. 40. 
 57. Id. arts. 24, 27. 
 58. Eekelaar, supra note 23, at 170. 
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example, the rights to food, health care, education, recreation and 
play”),59 rather than “autonomy” interests (the right to due process, 
for example).60  
Of course, many of the basic and developmental rights are subject 
to the express qualification that they be fulfilled within the means of 
the prospective parents or state party.61 Regardless, the question 
remains as to what prospective parents and the state are obligated to 
do when neither can assure prospective children their basic and 
developmental CRC rights.62 Are these standards primarily 
aspirational, or are they actual binding norms on states parties? 
What, if anything, does the implementation of these rights mean for 
prospective parents’ procreative rights? 
Recall that the deprivation (or, more accurately, violation) of 
children’s rights is a given today. The Committee has stated:  
Young children are entitled to a standard of living adequate 
for their physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social 
development (art. 27). The Committee notes with concern 
that even the most basic standard of living is not assured for 
millions of young children, despite widespread recognition of 
the adverse consequences of deprivation.63  
Clearly, a state violates children’s rights by not providing adequate 
resources. But could not, or should not, a state also prevent 
deprivation through policies that directly address population growth? 
And, do not children’s basic and developmental rights also create 
legal duties on prospective parents? Does a state violate the CRC by 
providing incentives, however subtle, for prospective parents to have 
children where those children will be born in circumstances below 
the CRC threshold?  
 
 
 59. Hammarberg, supra note 2, at 100. 
 60. See Eekelaar, supra note 23, at 170-71. These categories of basic needs 
overlap. See id. (elevating basic and developmental interests above autonomy 
interests). 
 61. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1, art. 27. 
 62. See id. arts. 24, 26- 29, 31 (guaranteeing various rights to children without 
also outlining express mechanisms for the provision of those rights, or remedies 
where those rights cannot be provided by parents or states). 
 63. General Comment No. 7, supra note 35, ¶ 26. 
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Using the CRC’s standards, we can easily construct legal 
principles of prospective parental obligation from deontological, 
consequentialist, and justice perspectives. With regard to the 
deontological, we should first note that rights that protecting a 
certain class’s interests will often conflict with other classes’ rights.64 
It follows that parents’ and children’s rights will sometimes diverge 
from one another.65 As with many human rights, there is always “the 
common problem of resolving conflicts between rights (such as 
rights to speech and to privacy, as accommodated in the law of 
defamation) that also may lead to a ‘limitation,’ in this case of one 
right to give space to the other.”66 In general, the act of balancing 
rights via correlative duties is consistent with the Convention.67  
Deonotologically speaking, the CRC endows prospective children 
with positive claim-rights that exert correlative duties on parents. 
These duties, in turn, conflict with and therefore limit, prospective 
parents’ negative liberty-rights to procreate. For example, a 
prospective parent who wishes to have a large family may have a 
right to procreate, but that right will be limited by the correlative 
duty she owes to her prospective children not to bring them into sub-
standard, rights-violating conditions. 
We can also discuss the principle from a more consequentialist 
perspective, taking account of the value of the rights the CRC 
guarantees.68 States parties must expend resources to comply with the 
CRC and they must divide these limited resources among the 
children in need. Therefore, states can increase compliance with the 
CRC by either finding more resources (including those obtainable 
through international cooperation), or reducing the number of 
children for whom they must provide. To the extent that states are 
 
 64. See Jeremy Waldron, Rights in Conflict, 99 ETHICS 503, 503-06 (1989). 
 65. Hammarberg, supra note 2, at 100. 
 66. HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: 
LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 154 (3d ed. 2008). 
 67. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1, art. 3(2) (directing 
states to consider the duties of a child’s “parents, legal guardians, or other 
individuals legally responsible” for the child when determining how best to 
effectuate the rights guaranteed in the Convention). 
 68. See Amartya Sen, Fertility and Coercion, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1035, 1038-40 
(1996) (noting Sen’s compromise between utilitarian goal-based and libertarian 
rights-based analyses). Sen suggests that rights, themselves, are akin to goals, thus 
endowing rights with intrinsic utilitarian value. Id. 
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unable to increase resources, they can urge prospective parents to 
forgo procreating, in a way that ensures the maximum number of 
children are enjoying their basic and developmental rights.69 If they 
do not, and thereby permit children to be born into rights-depriving 
conditions, states parties will fail to comply with the CRC.  
Finally, we can discuss the principle from a justice perspective. 
John Rawls’s “generational” principle holds that we must leave 
future generations more than we ourselves were given.70 Lukas 
Meyer, in his piece Intergenerational Justice, also presents various 
norms in arguing that, regardless of which we choose, 
“[c]onsiderations based upon the rights of future people can guide 
prospective parents in deciding whether they should revise their 
decision to conceive out of regard for the children they would 
otherwise have.”71 If the CRC delineates those circumstances in 
which it is just or unjust to procreate, it might also preemptively 
enjoin a prospective parent from acting unjustly and prohibit him or 
her from having a child under certain circumstances.  
Yael Aridor Bar-Ilan has systematically examined the issue of ex 
ante versus ex post justice (i.e., whether to ban torture ex ante, or to 
decide whether particular instances of torture were unjust ex post).72 
He suggests that any ex post exception to an ex ante rule should be 
conditioned on “the ability to universalize the decision to other future 
cases.”73 If the CRC holds that it is unjust for children to live in 
 
 69. I do not want to enter a full-scale utilitarian discussion of how to read the 
CRC, but I assume that the argument here is based on rule-maximizing the average 
welfare of children in a given state, as opposed to maximizing total welfare. See 
Jesper Ryberg et al., The Repugnant Conclusion § 2.1, in STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2006), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/repugnant-conclusion/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2010) 
(remarking that although a rule centered on maximizing average welfare and 
another rule centered on maximizing total welfare dictate “the same moral 
ranking” when comparing populations of the same size, those moral rankings will 
change when comparing populations of different sizes). 
 70. Woodhouse, supra note 26, at 1755 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE 284-93 (1971)). 
 71. Lukas Meyer, Intergenerational Justice § 3.2, in STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2008), http://plato.stanford. 
edu/entries/justice-intergenerational/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2010). 
 72. See Yael Aridor Bar-Ilan, Justice: When Do We Decide?, 39 CONN. L. REV. 
923, 926 (2007) (observing that debate between ex ante and ex post is applicable to 
many areas of law in addition to torture, such as contracts and civil procedure). 
 73. Id. at 970. 
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certain conditions but we read it to permit only remedial action ex 
post a child’s birth (for example, inviting aid organizations to 
provide neo-natal medical services amidst a fertility rate spike), then 
we violate Bar-Ilan’s rule. We would have employed exclusively ex 
post reasoning by not also considering that the state should have 
acted to reduce fertility rates. Even if interpreting the CRC to permit 
only ex post action is an exception to a general ex ante rule, it might 
also fail Bar-Ilan’s test because the exception—allowing children to 
be born absent adequate conditions—cannot be universalized without 
ignoring CRC rights. 
Finally, aside from the deontological, consequentialist, and justice 
perspectives, the principle that the CRC imposes obligations on 
prospective parents has ramifications for the right to procreate. 
Prospective parents determine the conditions into which their future 
children are born, and at least the initial conditions in which those 
children will live. Moreover, it may be that these conditions do not 
meet and are therefore in conflict with the conditions required by the 
CRC. When this conflict arises, what are member states, as the final 
obligors under the Convention,74 to do? Are they to wait for each 
child to be born in sub-CRC conditions, and then rush to change 
those conditions? In failing to take preventive action, states are 
essentially ignoring a foreseen series of events that will cause a 
massive influx of refugees—refugees whom the law protects but for 
whom resources are lacking. 
Future children’s welfare hinges on the decisions prospective 
parents in each member state make. This is true with regard to both 
the timing and number of children prospective parents choose to 
have. A parent may choose to have a child in a situation where it is 
virtually assured that the child will live in violation of the 
Convention’s minimum standards; a parent may have five children 
when sufficient resources exist to ensure the sufficient welfare of 
only one or two. We cannot take the Convention seriously while also 
holding that it should exert no influence on prospective parents’ 
procreative decisions. 
 
 74. See General Comment No. 5, supra note 28, ¶ 41 (“The Committee 
reiterates that in all circumstances, the State which ratified or acceded to the 
Convention remains responsible for ensuring the full implementation of the 
Convention throughout the [territories under its] jurisdiction.”). 
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With all of this in mind, we can employ our new framework. 
Using a child-centered perspective that accounts for potentiality and 
that places obligations on prospective parents, we can attempt to read 
the CRC as limiting prospective parents’ rights to procreate if their 
children would be deprived of the basic and developmental rights 
that the CRC guarantees.  
II. REREADING THE CONVENTION  
A. DUTIES ON PARENTS GENERALLY  
Perhaps the first question to answer when looking at the CRC in 
light of this framework is whether the CRC places any duties on 
parents with regard to the children they already have. This may seem 
simple enough, but in domestic regimes the triangular relations of 
child, parent, and state are often confusing, and interposing an 
international treaty regime and treaty-body only makes matters more 
complex.  
It seems that as a general matter the CRC does create positive and 
negative rights that parents have the “primary responsibility” to 
fulfill and to respect; although the state is the secondary obligor with 
regard to all CRC rights.75 That is, the CRC obligates states to fulfill 
the children’s rights if the parents do not. “The CRC fully 
recognizes, in very explicit terms not found in any other human 
rights treaty, that parents have the primary responsibility for the 
upbringing and development of their child,” but states parties are 
simultaneously obligated to assist parents in meeting those 
obligations.76 The state must intervene where the parents fail to 
uphold their duties,77 and shall also take action to secure 
“maintenance for the child from the parents.”78 Note that this final 
obligation, found in Article 27(4), applies whether or not the parent 
has custody of the child.79 Parents, having created the child, can be 
 
 75. Jaap E. Doek, The Eighteenth Birthday of Convention of the Rights of the 
Child: Achievements and Challenges, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 61, 63 (2007). 
 76. Id. (concluding that the state does not infringe on parental rights by 
undertaking the obligation to provide for and protect children where parents 
cannot, but rather acts in partnership with parents). 
 77. GERALDINE VAN BUEREN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE RIGHTS OF 
THE CHILD 72 (1995). 
 78. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1, art. 27(4). 
 79. Id. 
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obligated by the state to provide support whether or not they enjoy 
the reciprocal benefit of the child’s company. 
Given the triangular relationship between state, parent, and child, 
it seems reasonable that a state could implement the CRC through 
legislation that provides disincentives to procreate when prospective 
parents would forseeably fail their primary duty, while 
simultaneously materially assisting the prospective parents to 
improve conditions, so that at some future time, their child would not 
be deprived of his or her rights. This process would not be entirely 
distinct from the procedure some U.S. courts have outlined for “no 
procreation” orders. Such orders are issued when prospective parents 
are deemed unfit to parent based on recidivist child abuse and 
neglect,80 and are converted to “no custody” orders under which the 
state takes custody in the event the parent has a child.  
But while the CRC may impose duties on parents, the chief 
question remains as to whether it can also impose duties on 
prospective parents. That answer will turn on whether we can read 
the CRC as protecting future or prospective children.  
 
 
 
 80. See, e.g., In re V.R., 6 Misc. 3d 1003(A), 2004 WL 3029874 (N.Y. Fam. 
Ct. 2004). There the court said: 
The court offers these factors as a 4-prong test narrowly tailored to meet the 
“strict scrutiny test” for impinging on constitutional rights . . . . (1) a neglect 
case is pending against the parent involving the removal of a child; and (2) the 
parent has previously had one or more children placed in foster care, 
voluntarily or involuntarily, or placed with a relative resource or similar 
individual as an alternative to foster care under the supervision of the 
Department; and (3) the parent has demonstrated that he or she will not or 
cannot for the reasonably foreseeable future have the capacity to physically 
take care of the activities of daily living of a child at issue in the neglect case, 
i.e., providing food, clothing, shelter, health needs, education needs, etc; and 
(4) the parent has demonstrated that he or she will not or cannot reasonably 
for the foreseeable future provide for the child's needs financially, by any 
legitimate means (including welfare, temporary assistance, disability 
payments, unemployment, wages, wages of a spouse or partner, etc.). 
Id. at *8. 
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B. DUTIES TO PROSPECTIVE CHILDREN 
1. The Preamble  
For our purposes, and keeping in mind the Vienna Convention’s 
“ordinary meaning” standard,81 the most interesting language is in 
the CRC’s Preamble and first definitional provision. Together, these 
ask states parties to bear in mind that “the child . . . needs special 
safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as 
well as after birth,”82 and define a child as “every human being below 
the age of eighteen years.”83 
Both scholars and courts are split over whether the two provisions, 
taken together, apply the CRC’s protections to fetuses. Some find 
unequivocally that, at least with regard to the Article 6 guarantee of a 
right to life, the CRC does not interfere with a woman’s right to an 
abortion: “[a]t most, this language recognises a state’s duty to 
promote a child’s capacity to survive and thrive after birth, by 
targeting the pregnant woman’s nutrition and health.”84 Others find 
the opposite:  
CRC provisions may be interpreted as recognizing a fetus as 
a child in need of protection. . . . [T]he CRC does not 
establish when childhood begins. Although an individual 
eighteen years or older is not a ‘child’ under the CRC, the 
CRC does not set a floor at which childhood starts.85  
Interestingly, the Committee, referring to discrimination against 
girl children, noted that among other objectionable practices, “[t]hey 
may be the victims of selective abortion.”86 This could certainly 
 
 81. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 29, art. 31. 
 82. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1, pmbl. 
 83. Id. art. 1. 
 84. Christina Zampas & Jaime M. Gher, Abortion as a Human Right – 
International and Regional Standards, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 249, 263 (2008). 
 85. Laine Rutkow & Joshua T. Lozman, Suffer the Children?: A Call for the 
United States Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 161, 186 (2006); see also Abby F. Janoff, Rights of 
the Pregnant Child v. Rights of the Unborn Under the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, 22 B.U. INT’L L.J. 163, 166 (2004) (“The plain meaning of the 
Convention’s terms does not clarify whether the Convention provisions apply to 
‘child’ before birth.”). 
 86. General Comment No. 7, supra note 35, ¶ 11(b)(i). 
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suggest that the Committee considers the CRC as applying before 
birth. Alternatively, the Committee could instead be concerned about 
the broader effects of selective abortion on women as a class of 
persons, or that such selection will cause disastrous gender 
imbalances in the future population, rather than focusing on any 
putative harm to fetuses.  
Courts in Australia have found both that the CRC does not apply 
to unborn children87 and that it should not be interpreted so narrowly 
as to only apply to a “living child.”88 The Convention’s travaux 
préparatoires do not clarify the matter. This might suggest that some 
delegations in the drafting process did think that there would first 
have to be conception before the CRC’s protections could engage.89 
At the same time, some other delegations thought it could apply to 
prospective children, with some drafters finding that “before birth” 
could refer to domestic legislation protecting the inheritance rights of 
future children.90 Still others thought that the Preamble’s language 
could be interpreted more broadly to refer to more than the abortion 
issue.91  
I would argue instead that our framework allows us to evade the 
entire abortion debate, and to make perfect sense of the provisions, 
as well as the travaux préparatoires. Under our framework, the 
Preamble and Article 1’s definition of a “child” encompass both 
extant and prospective children, as opposed to prospective abortees, 
with the result that prospective parents are under a duty to act so that 
any child born is not deprived of his or her Convention rights.  
It is not clear that any class of future persons (including 
prospective children) also includes fetuses, if and when they are 
 
 87. See Ly v. Minister for Immigration (2000) 2000 A.A.T.A. 339, 2000 WL 
1242339, ¶ 73 (finding that although the Preamble of the CRC appears to 
acknowledge unborn children, the CRC would “need to give specific or implied 
recognition to unborn children in specific circumstances” in order to lend credence 
to the argument that it exetends to the unborn). 
 88. Griffiths v. Minister for Immigration (2003) 176 F.L.R. 272, ¶ 90, 2003 
WL 21485908, ¶ 90, rev’d on other grounds, (2004) 2004 WL 288549 (appealing 
to “natural justice” in determining the scope of CRC). 
 89. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: A 
GUIDE TO THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” 102 (Sharon Detrick ed., 1992) 
[hereinafter GUIDE TO THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES”]. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. at 109. 
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simultaneously considered as prospective abortees; these fetuses then 
lack the necessary condition that they will exist in the future. The 
whole question of aborting the fetus cuts off the presumption that 
allows one to consider the future person it would otherwise become. 
In contrast to determining whether a person can or will exist in a 
particular state of affairs that may or may not be sufficient under the 
standards of the CRC, abortion entirely negates the future state of 
affairs that the fetus would have otherwise had. Unless one can 
establish the legal personhood of the fetus itself, it is difficult to 
argue that the CRC applies because there will be no future child with 
an actual life to which the CRC could apply. It seems entirely 
inconsistent with the CRC to argue that we are concerned for the 
fetus’s future life per se, that is, the value of its life irrespective of 
the context in which he or she lives. If life per se were enough for 
children, and no minimum threshold quality of life were required, the 
CRC would not exist. 
Keep in mind that, while the Preamble is not itself a binding 
provision, it can be used in the interpretation of the treaty,92 and that 
states have broad discretion to enlarge the protections provided, as 
opposed to narrowing them.93 Reading the CRC in light of our 
framework—a child-centered perspective coupled with an 
appreciation for protecting the potentiality of the prospective child, 
as opposed to the potentiality of a prospective abortee whom the 
parents do not wish to bear—forces us to consider the Preamble and 
Article 1 so as to maximize the protection of prospective children at 
the highest point of potentiality. In contrast, reading the provisions as 
prohibiting abortion ensures that children will be born unwanted by 
their parents, and potentially in conditions that fall below the CRC’s 
threshold standards. Finally, reading the Preamble as a nullity would 
be odd, especially in light of the references in the travaux 
préparatoires.  
 
 92. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 29, art. 31 
(instructing states parties to interprate treaties in good faith and in the context of 
the preamble and annexes); see also SHARON DETRICK, A COMMENTARY ON THE 
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 56 (1999) 
(examining arguments that relying on a preamble, standing alone, could result in 
erroneous treaty interpretation). 
 93. See VAN BUEREN, supra note 77, at 34-35 (asserting that states parties to 
the CRC should determine “the beginning of childhood . . . by [their] own 
domestic legislation”). 
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Of course, all of this analysis smacks of a rather artificial and 
unnecessary focus on the ontology of the supposed rights-holder, the 
prospective child. We need not take such a focus to protect children, 
but can turn our attention instead to the duties of the prospective 
parent, while still maintaining an appreciation for protecting the 
prospective child’s potentiality.  
2. Adoption in a child’s best interests  
Article 21, dealing with adoption, mandates that states parties 
“shall ensure that the best interests of the child shall be the 
paramount consideration.”94 This provision, with the state obligation 
in Article 21(a) to oversee the process and the general obligation to 
consider the child’s best interests in all state actions,95 suggests that 
states parties cannot permit adoptions unless the children will be 
made better off as a result. In other words, these provisions suggest 
that the adoption must be a beneficent act on the part of the state. 
This requirement means that prospective parents must offer certain 
conditions, or a minimum threshold quality of life, before the state 
can allow them to adopt and become extant or actual parents. In 
effect, the state must actively forestall to ensure that prospective 
parents meet the needs of their prospective children. 
Although adoption is not procreation, both inherently involve “the 
most fundamental human rights of the most helpless of humans—the 
rights of children to the kind of family love and care that will enable 
them to grow up with a decent chance of living a healthy and 
fulfilling life.”96 Thus, the fact that the CRC is so explicit about the 
role of the state to ensure that prospective adoptive parents can 
provide a minimum threshold quality of life, might suggest that the 
failure of the CRC to mention similar obligations with regard to 
procreative parents dooms my arguments. However, I would argue 
that there is no meaningful moral distinction between adoptive and 
 
 94. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1, art. 21. 
 95. Id. arts. 3.1, 21(a). 
 96. Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: Thoughts on the Human 
Rights Issues, 13 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 151, 151-52 (2007). “Children need 
loving, nurturing parents . . . . [and] food and shelter and protection.” See id. at 
191. Indeed, these are the essentially the basic, developmental, and provisional 
interests to which I refer above. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. 
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procreative parenting.97 Do not the prospective children of 
procreative parents have rights to the kind of family love and care 
that will enable them to grow up with a decent chance of living a 
healthy and fulfilling life, such as food, shelter, and protection? 
Reading the CRC to make such a distinction between adoption and 
procreation is inconsistent with both the proposed child-centered 
perspective, which accounts for potentiality, and with moral theories 
that place obligations on prospective parents. Doing so would read 
the CRC as permitting (and in effect, through the tacit agreement of 
the influential norm-setting state, promoting) prospective parents to 
procreate in conditions that would deprive the children of the basic 
and developmental rights the CRC guarantees.  
3. Maximizing children’s interests and family planning 
Other provisions of the CRC, seen through the proposed 
framework, further support the claim that states can read the CRC as 
protecting prospective children and can implement obligations to 
them in their domestic legislation. Two relevant themes can be 
discerned in the CRC: (1) the obligation on states to maximize the 
extent to which they fulfill and respect children’s rights, and (2) the 
much more subtle reference to the role of family planning in assuring 
the success of the CRC.  
With regard to the first, Article 41 provides that nothing in the 
CRC shall affect the provisions of domestic or international law that 
are “more conducive to the realization of the rights of the child.”98 In 
fact, “[t]he Committee encourages all States Parties to enact and 
implement within their jurisdiction legal provisions that are more 
conducive to the realisation of the rights of the child than those 
contained in the Convention.”99 Again, per the Committee, 
“[w]hatever their economic circumstances, States are required to 
undertake all possible measures towards the realisation of the rights 
of the child, paying special attention to the most disadvantaged 
 
 97. In the end, I believe that those who view the prospective children of 
procreation as less deserving of protection will find their argument turns on a 
specific view of children they may not even be aware of – the view that 
prospective children are property. See infra Part III. 
 98. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1, art. 41. 
 99. General Comment No. 5, supra note 28, ¶ 23. 
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groups.”100 If a state can implement the CRC in a way that ensures 
children are not deprived of the rights the CRC guarantees them, then 
it must do so. It must, in all of its actions, including termination of 
parental rights for neglect and abuse,101 consider the best interests of 
the child.102 With regard to economic, social, and cultural rights, 
states parties must act to fulfill them to the “maximum extent of their 
available resources,”103 and shall ensure “to the maximum extent 
possible the survival and development of the child.”104  
We can couple these rather explicit references to maximization 
with the CRC’s more subtle reference to family planning. Article 
24(2)(f) urges states parties to take appropriate measures to “develop 
preventative health care, guidance for parents and family planning 
education and services.”105 During the CRC’s drafting process, some 
states viewed this provision as requiring the state to educate its 
citizens in responsible parenthood, based on not just maternal and 
infant health, but also on ethics and morality.106 The Committee has 
said that “[i]t is particularly important that promotion of children’s 
rights should be integrated into preparation for parenthood and 
parenting education.”107  
Article 24(2)(f) should be read here in conjunction with Article 
18(2), which states that “[f]or the purpose of guaranteeing and 
promoting the rights set forth in the present Convention, States 
Parties shall render appropriate assistance to parents and legal 
guardians in the performance of their child-rearing responsibilities 
and shall ensure the development of institutions, facilities, and 
services for the care of children.”108 If the CRC is also read as 
applying its protections to prospective children, this might obligate 
the state to provide significant family planning institutions to ensure 
that prospective parents can have children in states of affairs not 
 
 100. Id. ¶ 8. 
 101. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1, arts. 9, 20 
(providing special protection for a child separated from their parents through 
proper judicial determination). 
 102. Id. art. 3(1). 
 103. Id. art. 4. 
 104. Id. art. 6(2). 
 105. Id. art. 24(2)(f). 
 106. See DETRICK, supra note 92, at 414. 
 107. General Comment No. 5, supra note 28, ¶ 54. 
 108. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1, art. 18(2). 
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violative of CRC standards—for example, state subsidized 
reproductive health services to ensure that parents do not have to 
divide whatever resources they have among three children if they 
wish to only have two but lacked access to contraception to ensure 
that result.  
Consequently, it appears that (1) states are required by the CRC to 
educate and guide prospective parents in promoting their children’s 
rights and that (2) the bases for such education and guidance may 
include ethics and morality, which is not surprising, given that the 
raison d’être of the CRC is the promotion of what are, at their base, 
moral rights. Finally, (3) taking into account the principles discussed 
above, we know that states are explicitly obligated to maximize the 
extent to which they fulfill and respect children’s rights, at least their 
basic and developmental rights.  
Thinking in terms of our proposed framework, if as a matter of 
empirical fact a particular state party can best fulfill and ensure 
children’s rights through ethical and moral family planning guidance, 
is it obligated to take that path? If a particular state party knows that, 
even with international cooperation, it and its relevant prospective 
parents have only the resources to provide for X number of children, 
is the state obligated to effectively guide prospective parents in 
making the appropriate family planning choices? Does a state party 
fail its obligations by not doing so?  
Consider again our example case of Afghanistan.109 Despite the 
UNPF’s presence, there is staunch local opposition to family 
planning, a consequence of cultural norms regarding the role 
prospective children should play in the labor force, and of deeply 
held religious convictions. I suggest that the government of 
Afghanistan, and many states like it, face very real conflicts between 
ensuring CRC success through ethical and moral family planning 
guidance and respecting contradictory norms regarding parents’ 
procreative freedom and their relations to their prospective children.  
If the Convention represents a sea change in the international legal 
community’s thinking about the relationship between children and 
adults, it has also inadvertently initiated the another sea change. 
Taken to their logical conclusion, the CRC’s norms call for a change 
 
 109. See supra text accompanying notes 18-23. 
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in the traditional relationship between prospective parents and their 
prospective children. It is a change that, in certain parts of the world 
especially challenged by population growth, is well under way. 
4. An Example: Family planning in China  
My arguments for reading the CRC as limiting the procreative 
rights of would-be parents may seem largely abstract, because of my 
reliance on moral theory and the value of potentiality. But in fact, 
there is precedent for such an approach, though it first began over a 
decade before the CRC came into force. The complex family 
planning regimes of the People’s Republic of China (“China”) 
cannot all be boiled down to the simplistic and monolithic “one child 
policy” many Western commentators understand it to be. 
Implemented in the largest polity in the world, they in fact parallel 
the proposed framework in many ways, and serve, inter alia, to 
protect the basic and developmental rights of prospective children. 
As an initial matter, the common tendency in the U.S. to refer to 
China’s planned birth policies as a monolithic and simplistic “one-
child policy” is inaccurate and demonstrates the glaring disparity 
between U.S. perception and the reality of the China’s policies. In 
2007, researchers at the University of California at Irvine undertook 
what is perhaps the most comprehensive study of China’s family 
planning polices to date. They found the characterization of a 
simplistic “one-child policy” incorrect, noting that the study exposed 
the policy’s underlying “intricacies and complexities.”110 The study 
focused on what is in reality a patchwork of diverse local policies, 
riddled with a variety of exceptions, and created “a quantitative 
summary of China’s current fertility policy, informing what is 
pursued in terms of population control nationally, on the basis of 
diverse local policies.”111 Most importantly, it determined that “[t]he 
majority of the Chinese population (more than 70 percent) live in 
areas with a policy fertility level at 1.3 to 2.0 children per couple.”112  
Furthermore, and perhaps most surprising to the researchers, the 
study found “that levels of government-mandated fertility and 
 
 110. Gu Baochang et al., China’s Local and National Fertility Policies at the 
End of the Twentieth Century, 33 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 129-30 (2007). 
 111. Id. at 130. 
 112. Id. at 144. 
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achieved fertility have converged in China.”113 That is, the 
population largely complies with the policies. While the study did 
find that a one-child target was still a dominant goal among the 
disparate policies, the complexity and flexibility of the polices reflect 
a regime that has been largely localized and tailored to meet diverse 
and conflicting needs.114 
Originally, the policy was in fact more monolithic. In 1979, faced 
with massive starvation and economic stagnation, China adopted its 
national population control policy to stabilize growth by the year 
2000, 115 which set a minimum marriage age for men and women 
and, subject to certain exceptions, announced a policy that generally 
attempted to limit each couple to having one child via a system of 
incentives and disincentives administered by a State Family Planning 
Commission. But early on, the official policy prohibited “forced 
 
 113. Id. at 145. 
 114. See id. at 144 (characterizing the convergence as “extraordinary, even for 
china where the political will of the leadership . . . is virtually unparalleled in the 
world”). 
 115. See Xu Ming Li v. Ashcroft, 356 F.3d 1153, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(detailing the petitioners’ experiences with what the court termed China’s 
“Coercive Population Control Program”). In a 1991 official White Paper on human 
rights in China, the Chinese government stated that “[m]ore than a quarter of the 
annual addition to the national income is consumed by the new population born 
during the same year.” INFO. OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE P.R.C., 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA § VIII (1991), available at http://english.peopledaily. 
com.cn/whitepaper/4(8).html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) [hereinafter 1991 WHITE 
PAPER]; see also Gerrie Zhang, U.S. Asylum Policy and Population Control in the 
People’s Republic of China, 18 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 557, 566 (1996). Zhang notes 
that: 
The population of China, growing at a rate of fourteen million per year, 
reached 1.185 billion at the end of 1993. Although the government plan in the 
1980s set a goal to control the population growth rate in order to keep the 
population under 1.2 billion until the year 2000, the population of the Chinese 
mainland surpassed that milestone in 1995. The revised government plan calls 
for restricting the population growth rate so that the total population will not 
exceed 1.3 billion before the year 2000, 1.4 billion before the year 2010, or 
1.5 to 1.6 billion before the middle of the twenty-first century. The Chinese 
government maintains that without effective control the rapid population 
growth could threaten the subsistence of the Chinese nation, leading to 
catastrophe and an exodus of refugees. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). China is home to one-fifth of the world's population, which 
is “squeezed onto 7 percent of the world's arable land.” Matter of Chang, 20 I. & 
N. Dec. 38, 41 n.2 (1989). 
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measures”116 and exempted China’s minority groups.117 When China 
enacted its first family planning laws in 2002, prospective parents 
were encouraged—but not required—to comply with the law by 
limiting themselves to one child.118 The UC Irvine study found that 
“the majority of rural couples who have one child go on to have a 
second birth.”119 
As the study also notes, the policies are implemented by local 
committees and volunteers, which devise their own regulations to 
meet the Commission’s quotas.120 The policies are enforced with 
punishments and incentives ranging from imprisonment and fines to 
cash awards and better housing, though some officials have 
employed more coercive and illegal methods such as forced 
abortions and sterilization.121 One scholar has attributed the existence 
of such coercive tactics to the fact that policy objectives could not 
otherwise be met in the face of a higher than expected level of 
“popular resistance.”122  
 
 
 116. See Zhang, supra note 115, at 563-67 (observing that although the 
government prohibited “coercive methods,” occasional abuse occurred); see also 
Charles E. Shulman, The Grant of Asylum to Chinese Citizens Who Oppose 
China’s One-Child Policy: A Policy of Persecution or Population Control?, 16 
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 313, 316-19 (1996) (describing how China’s population 
control policy was enforced by a combination of incentives and punishments). 
 117. Shulman, supra note 116, at 319; Zhang, supra note 115, at 561. 
 118. Gu Baochang et al., supra note 110, at 131. 
 119. Id. at 130. 
 120. See id. at 131. 
 121. See Paula Abrams, Population Politics: Reproductive Rights and U.S. 
Asylum Policy, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 881, 894-95 (2000) (providing examples of 
inherently coercive measures designed to achieve Chinese population policy goals, 
such as harassing pregnant women and the creation of “qualified birth control 
villages,” where each couples’ ability to live and have children is predicated on 
whether the other couples in the village have complied with the family planning 
laws); see also Graciela Gómez, China’s Eurgenics Law as Grounds for Granting 
Asylum, 5 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 563, 567-68 (1996) (providing a detailed 
explanation of the enforcement methods, including the amount of discretion and 
flexibility that local officials have in determining how the enforce the policy). See 
generally Xiaorong Li, License to Coerce: Violence Against Women, State 
Responsibility, and Legal Failures in China’s Family-Planning Program, 8 YALE 
J.L. & FEMINISM 145 (1996) (detailing the history of the program, examining its 
regional and national legality, and exploring the contradictory governmental 
policies that have grown out of the program). 
 122. See Li, supra note 121, at 152. 
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In defending its policies against international criticism, China 
stated that it “has only two alternatives in handling its population 
problem: to implement the family planning policy or to allow blind 
growth in births. . . . Which of the two pays more attention to human 
rights and is more humane?”123 It later implied that unbridled 
reproduction competes with other “human rights,” including the right 
to subsistence, the “most important of all human rights.”124 
According to China, its family planning policies seek to “combine 
the universal principles of human rights with its national 
conditions:”125 
Individual reproductive behaviour and the needs and 
aspirations of society should be reconciled. . . . All couples 
and individuals have the basic right to decide freely and 
responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to 
have the information, education and means to do so; the 
responsibility of couples and individuals in the exercise of 
this right takes into account the needs of their living and 
future children, and their responsibilities towards the 
community.126  
China’s constitution considers both the individual rights of parents 
and parents’ community responsibilities. It addresses the policy 
specifically, stating that “both the husband and wife have the duty to 
practice family planning,” and further stipulating that individual 
rights may not impinge on collective societal interests.127  
Of course, as with most legal regimes, enforcement of China’s 
family planning policies has included coercive enforcement 
measures, some of which violate international human rights law. 
This issue has become especially prominent in China and abroad 
since the arrest and sentencing of Chen Guangcheng, who recently 
exposed a large number of forced abortions and sterilizations that 
 
 123. 1991 WHITE PAPER, supra note 115, § VIII. 
 124. See id. at § I (tasking the Chinese government with “secur[ing] a well-off 
livelihood for the people throughout the country”). 
 125. INFO. OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE P.R.C., WHITE PAPER ON 
POPULATION IN CHINA ¶ 10 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 WHITE PAPER]. 
 126. INFO. OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE P.R.C., FAMILY PLANNING IN 
CHINA § VII (1995) (quoting World Population Plan of Action, G.A. Res. 3344 
(XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., U.N. Doc A/RES/3344 (1974)). 
 127. Shulman, supra note 116, at 316 (quoting XIAN FA [Constitution] 49 
(1982)); accord Zhang, supra note 115, at 562. 
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were carried out by local family planning officials,128 and since Jin 
Yani, a woman living in Changli County, Hebei Province, sued in 
2007 for the extensive damages she claims to have suffered as a 
result of a forced abortion procedure at the hands of local family 
planning officials.129 But as Mrs. Jin’s suit demonstrates, and as has 
been noted by several commentators (including the organization on 
Human Rights in China which has been highly critical of China), 
such forced measures, including sterilization and abortion, are 
prohibited by law nationally in China,130 and the central family 
planning Commission claims to have arrested and fired local officials 
that have engaged in such measures.131 
Despite such abuses (which may be a part of a larger problem of 
balancing human rights and law enforcement in China), as a matter 
of state policy, implementation and enforcement of the policy are 
“left to local and provincial officials responsible for ensuring 
compliance through economic sanctions, peer pressure, and 
propaganda.”132 Compliance with the policies is normally tied to 
official employment status and salary, and most of the enforcement 
occurs through that and other economic sanctions such as fines, or 
 
 128. Calum MacLeod, Chinese Rights Champion Ordered to Prison; Convicted 
After Drawing Attention to Forced Abortions, Sterilizations, USA TODAY, Aug. 
25, 2006, at A4. 
 129. See Richard Spencer, Chinese Woman in Legal First Over Abortion Case, 
TELEGRAPH (U.K.), July 1, 2008, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ma 
in.jhtml?xml=/news/2008/01/07/wchina107.xml (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) 
(noting that when Mrs. Jin conceived, she was not yet twenty years old, which is 
the legal minimum age for becoming pregnant under current laws). 
 130. See id. 
The Law on Population and Family Planning was passed in 2001 in an effort 
to address abuses by local family planning workers . . . . The new law bans 
practices such as abandonment, infanticide, and the use of physical force or 
the confiscation of property as a means of enforcing the policy. The law also 
replaces the fines that had once been levied for out-of-plan births and 
implements instead a ‘social compensation fee.’ The fee and payment 
schedule for couples that have out-of-plan births is based on average county 
income levels. 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: COMM. ON INT’L 
RELATIONS: “CHINA: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND COERCION IN ONE CHILD 
POLICY ENFORCEMENT” 2 (2004). 
 131. David Eimer, China Admits Women Were Forced to Have Abortions, THE 
INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Sep. 21, 2005, at 29. 
 132. Gómez, supra note 121, at 567. 
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social compensations fees.133 In all, the enforcement is tied to the 
closely-knit economic and social structure of each local community, 
and the pervasive influence of the local family planning committees.  
Lisa Gregory argues that China’s family planning policies must be 
looked at in light of their role in allowing the China to meet its 
international economic and social rights obligations:  
[F]rom a theoretical point of view, the economic inducements 
which constitute an essential component of [China’s] 
population policies do not in fact violate international human 
rights laws relating to a couple’s procreative rights. 
Reproductive rights, like many other types of ‘human rights,’ 
are not totally unrestricted . . . . Thus, parents who insist upon 
having more children in the face of economic sanctions, may, 
in the Chinese context, reasonably be viewed as behaving 
irresponsibly – as exposing their families to significant 
financial hardships and the community to a Malthusian 
nightmare.134  
However, she is quick to condemn as human rights violations de 
facto instances of tactics such as “coercered abortions, forced 
sterilizations and involuntary insertion of itnerunterine devices,” as 
well as de jure discrimination against children born out of local 
quotas.135  
Still, the most pressing question is whether “economic 
inducements,” or other expressive forms of law that do not clearly 
violate international human rights norms, constitute the sort of family 
planning guidance that the CRC may require. Note that while China 
implemented     its     family     planning   regimes    in   the  face    of 
 
 
 133. See id. at 567-68. 
 134. Lisa B. Gregory, Note, Examining the Economic Component of China’s 
One-Child Family Policy Under International Law: Your Money or Your Life, 6 J. 
CHINESE L. 45, 46 (1992) (citations omitted); see also Timothy John Fitzgibbon, 
Comment, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Are 
Children Really Protected? A Case Study of China’s Implementations, 20 LOY. 
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 325 (1998) (observing that the “penalties and 
consequnces” that parents face when they violate the Convention include fines, 
disqualification for certain benefits for their children, and termination from 
employment). 
 135. Gregory, supra note 134, at 46-47, 86-87. 
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overwhelming pro-nationalist cultural norms,136 three decades later, 
the family planning policies have largely been internalized.137  
In its “concluding observations” on China’s second CRC periodic 
report, the Committee noted that China had substantially reduced 
poverty, met key MDGs, and had taken action to eliminate selective 
abortion, infanticide, and non-registration of children at birth.138 It 
said nothing about the relationship between the family planning 
regimes, and obligations created by the CRC. However, officials in 
China have claimed that its family planning programs have played an 
integral, if not decisive, role in the nation’s historic and 
unprecedented social and economic development,139 development 
which has helped China to better meet its obligations under the CRC: 
Since the implementation of the family planning program, 
over 300 million births have been averted nationally, thus 
saving a great amount of payment for the upbringing of 
children for the society. This has alleviated the pressure of 
the excessive population growth on the natural resources and 
environment, thus contributing to the economic development 
and the improvement of the people’s living standards.  
With the gross national product (GNP) quadrupled over that 
of 1980 ahead of schedule, the Chinese people now live a 
relatively comfortable life. By the end of 1999, the 
population under the poverty line in the rural areas has 
decreased from over 250 million in the late 1970s to 34 
million, down from 33% to around 3% of the total rural 
population. The impoverished people in rural areas have 
basically achieved adequate feeding and clothing.140 
 
 136. See Zhang, supra note 119, at 560-61 (noting that, as late as 1974, Chinese 
spokesmen favored “rapid population growth”). 
 137. See Yilin Nie & Robert J. Wyman, The One-Child Policy in Shanghai: 
Acceptance and Internalization, 31POP. & DEV. REV. 313, 333-34 (2005) 
(concluding that the one-child policy today is considered so normal in Shanghai 
that its status as a law might be unnecessary). 
 138. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 44 of 
the Convention, Committee on the Rights of the Child, at 1, 5-7, 14 U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/CHN/CO/2 (Nov. 24, 2005) [hereinafter Consideration of Reports]. 
 139. See Zhang Weiqing, Population – The Key Issue for Continued Economic 
Progress in China, 10 CHINESE J. OF POPULATION SCI. 55 (1998) (believing 
population control to be essential for continued economic progess in China). 
 140. 2000 WHITE PAPER, supra note 125, ¶ 7. 
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It would be easy to dismiss these reports as state propaganda. But, 
the link they draw between rigorous population control and family 
planning measures, and economic growth is consistent with the 
demographic dividend discussed above.141 Experts note that:  
The difference between a total fertility rate of 2.1, which 
might have been achieved without [China’s] policy, and a 
total fertility rate of 1.6 (found today) releases 24% more 
resources for the family and national investment. The Indian 
economy has begun to grow rapidly, but unlike China the 
decline in fertility has been uneven, and states such as Bihar 
and Uttar Pradesh (total fertility rates of 4.4 and 4.8) remain 
mired in poverty.142  
Economic progress in China has been accompanied by equivalent 
social progress in terms of education, health, and the empowerment 
of women.143 This progress is not simply a state policy goal—the 
achievement of which requires derogating from reproductive rights. 
It is also the fulfillment of certain economic and social rights that 
China is obligated to provide, having signed and ratified the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(“ICESCR”).144 Because the U.S. has not historically recognized 
such positive rights (and indeed is not even a state party to the CRC), 
U.S. commentators who criticize China’s family planning programs 
often overlook this fact.145  
 
 141. See BLOOM ET AL., supra note 17 (discussing the relationship between 
fertility rates and economic growth). 
 142. Malcolm Potts, China’s One Child Policy, 333 BRIT. MED. J. 361, 
361(2006). 
 143. See 2000 WHITE PAPER, supra note 125, ¶ 7 (citing increases in the number 
of students attending college, the literacy rate, access to health care, and the 
number of women in the workplace). 
 144. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 
1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; The Secretary-General, ICESCR: China: Notification, 
C.N.7.2002.TREATIES-1 (Depositary Notification) (Jan. 3, 2002), available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter 
=4&lang=en#EndDec. 
 145. See Christina M. Cerna, Reflections on the Normative Status of the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1211, 
1212 (2009) (“The United States has . . . yet to become a party to the ICESCR.”); 
Vanessa L. Pi, Regulating Sperm Donation: Why Requiring Exposed Donation is 
Not the Answer, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 379, 393 (2009) (observing that 
almost 200 countries aside from the United Staets have ratified the CRC). 
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III. COUNTERARGUMENTS: ECONOMIC 
GROWTH, THE RIGHT TO PROCREATE, 
JUSTICIABILITY, AND DISCRIMINATION 
There are, of course, several counterarguments to reading the CRC 
as requiring efforts to curb procreation in sub-standard conditions. 
Moving from what I view as the weaker arguments to the stronger, it 
could be said (1) that real fertility rate declines would eventually 
have negative economic and therefore developmental consequences; 
(2) this interpretation is inconsistent with, and leads states to violate, 
prospective parents’ right to procreate, which is protected under 
international human rights regimes; (3) reading the CRC to protect 
the rights of prospective children creates rights and duties that are 
not justiciable; and finally (4) implementing the CRC in this way 
would inevitably prove de facto discriminatory, in that the right to 
procreate may often hinge on prospective parents’ property, 
disability, birth, education or other status. 146 I cannot do full justice 
to these arguments in this brief article, but I would like to say 
something about each.  
With regard to the first, I do not find it at all persuasive. As 
discussed above, reducing high fertility rates can create opportunities 
for economic growth when combined with specific educational, 
health, and labor-market policies. In contrast, sustained high fertility 
rates ensure more dependents than producers and prevent 
development by tying up resources that could otherwise be used for 
economic investment and family welfare.147 Those making this 
counterargument usually argue that overall economic growth will 
eventually slow as the population ages. This ignores what researchers 
have called the “second dividend,” in which older populations invest 
 
 146. Implementing the CRC in a discriminatory manner would be contrary to 
the Convention’s explicit instructions to states parties to avoid discrimination. See 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1, art. 2 (“States Parties shall 
respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each child 
within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the 
child’s or his or her parent’s or legal guardian’s race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, 
disability, birth or other status.”). 
 147. See BLOOM ET AL., supra note 17, at 28-30 (explaining that reduced fertility 
rates increase educational opportunities for both children and women). 
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heavily in the economy.148 More importantly, this counterargument is 
premised on an archaic view of economics and development that 
presumes growth is eternal and the world’s resources are infinite.149 
The second counterargument is that reading the CRC in the way I 
suggest requires states to violate prospective parents’ right to 
procreate, which is itself protected under international law. That 
argument seems to suggest that the right to procreate has no internal 
moral constraints (which runs headlong into all of the moral 
theorists’ arguments above, especially those made by O’Neill and 
Archard).150 It also suggests that, contrary to most rights theories, the 
right to procreate cannot be limited by conflicting rights.151  
This counterargument would probably hinge on Article 23(2) of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”),152 which guarantees the right “to found a family,” as well 
as similar provisions in other binding conventions and more 
expansive rights formulations in some recent non-binding 
declarations. Elsewhere I have argued at length that while there is a 
human right to procreate (embodied in part by Article 23(2)), when 
considering the narrow formulations in binding “hard law” sources in 
contrast to the broad formulations in “soft law” non-binding sources, 
the right should be considered satiable such that a state may balance 
it against conflicting rights after a parent has replaced him or 
herself.153 Others, like Carl Wellman, have argued that any 
 
 148. See id. at 39-42 (suggesting that this “dividend” stems from the the number 
of people participating in the work force, an increased tendency toward saving, and 
investments in human capital). Older generations invest in human capital by, for 
example, paying for younger generations to obtain higher education. Id. at 41-42. 
 149. See, e.g., HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 1 (1996). Daly refers to sustainable development as 
“resisted by most economic and political institutions, which are founded on 
traditional quantitative growth and legitimately fear its replacement by something 
as subtle and challenging as qualitative development.” Id. 
 150. O’Neill and Archard both assert that adults have duties and moral 
obligations to their prospective children. See supra Part I.B. 
 151. See, e.g., STEINER ET AL., supra note 66, at 154-55 (organizing various 
rights into categories ranging between non-derogable and permissibly limited 
rights). 
 152. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 23(2), Mar. 23, 
1976, 1999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 153. See generally Carter J. Dillard, Rethinking the Procreative Right, 10 YALE 
HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 27-37, 44-63 (2007) (examining the ways in which the 
right to procreate is constrained by other rights, including the rights of prospective 
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international human right to procreate is simply indeterminate and 
controversial.154 Moreover, the Human Rights Committee, in 
Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v. Mauritius, found that the level of protection 
available for families under Article 23 “depend[s] on different social, 
economic, political and cultural conditions and traditions.”155 Thus, a 
state might legitimately consider its available resources when 
balancing the procreative right, at least after replacement, against the 
rights of prospective children.  
Most problematically, this counterargument, based on a broad or 
limitless procreative right, seems to place all importance on the 
prospective parents’ act of creation as opposed to the interests of the 
child created. This is inconsistent with the CRC. Barbara Bennett 
Woodhouse recently noted, 
Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child . . . has been consistently opposed in the United 
States, with much of this opposition coming from defenders 
of the “traditional” family. These opponents believe that the 
Convention’s attempt to articulate a scheme of rights for 
children undermines the rights of parents. I believe that this 
concern is unjustified and that it reflects the continuing 
influence of a “property theory” of parenthood that was 
discredited long ago.156  
I would argue that Woodhouse’s point is even more apposite for 
prospective children. We are wrong to see them as future property to 
which we are entitled and to discount their interests. This error is 
reflected in claims of a broad or limitless procreative right.  
In contrast to ICCPR Article 23(2), which establishes the vague 
and arguably satiable right “to found a family,”157 the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(“CEDAW”)158 requires signatories to ensure that men and women 
 
children). 
 154. See CARL WELLMAN, MEDICAL LAW AND MORAL RIGHTS 135 (2005). 
 155. Communication No. 35/1978 from the U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., ¶ 
9.2(b)2(ii), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/12/D/35/1978 (Apr. 9, 1981). 
 156. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, From Property to Personhood: A Child-
Centered Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 5 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 313, 
313 (1998). 
 157. ICCPR, supra note 152, art. 23(2). 
 158. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
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have “[t]he same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the 
number and spacing of their children and to have access to the 
information, education and means to enable them to exercise these 
rights.”159 This seems to assure, in a binding “hard law” convention, 
a much broader procreative right. However, it has been argued that 
CEDAW merely “presumes the existence of procreative freedom in 
order to create an equal protection requirement.”160 CEDAW thus 
aims to eliminate discrimination between the sexes in the enjoyment 
of rights, but it relies on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(“UDHR”),161 ICCPR, and ICESCR as having established the 
underlying substantive rights CEDAW addresses.162 States agree 
under CEDAW Article 16 to eliminate discrimination by ensuring 
that men and women have the “same rights to decide freely and 
responsibly.”163 If a state recognizes a broader procreative right as 
part of its law, it must ensure that men and women may exercise that 
right equally; CEDAW does not create any new rights, but rather 
seeks to bolster rights already provided by the UDHR, ICCPR, and 
ICESCR. 
Put more simply, CEDAW should not be interpreted as creating a 
broader right to procreate for women than that enjoyed by men, but 
should instead be read as establishing parity between the two 
genders. If anything, there might be good reasons—beyond the scope 
of this article—for reading CEDAW to guard women against a broad 
“right” to have as many children as biologically possible and casting 
them as perpetual mothers subject to prenatal social and cultural 
norms that might operate within the scope of that right. 
 
Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. 
A/34/36 (Sep. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW]. 
 159. Id. art. 16(1)(e). Note, however, that an unusual number of countries have 
entered reservations to the treaty and Article16 in particular, making it “one of the 
most reserved international human rights documents.” Paula Abrams, Reservations 
About Women: Population Policy and Reproductive Rights, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 
1, 19 (1996). 
 160. Walter C. Long, Escape from Wonderland: Implementing Canada’s 
Rational Procedures to Evaluate Women’s Gender-Related Asylum Claims, 4 
UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 179, 235 n. 244 (1994). 
 161. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter 
UDHR]. 
 162. See CEDAW, supra note 158, pmbl. 
 163. Id. art. 16(1)(e). 
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Note that China’s family planning policies (as opposed to some 
instances of its enforcement) have generally not been questioned by 
CEDAW’s implementing body.164 In the last round of reporting and 
examination by that body, the only questions raised and the 
recommendations made relate to China’s need to take further action 
to halt selective abortion and female infanticide (which are acts 
committed by the citizenry and not the state) and to further 
investigate and prosecute any acts of forced sterilization and forced 
abortion.165 Nothing was said with regard to workplace demotion and 
social compensation fees violating international law. 
The third counterargument is that while my reading of the CRC 
may seem like the morally right thing to do, it creates rights that are 
nonjusticiable. Given that my argument does not alter the content of 
children’s rights, this counterargument seems to be focused on the 
fact that the rights-holder is a class of future persons, i.e. prospective 
parents’ prospective children. As discussed earlier, future persons 
can have rights that we ought to respect now,166 for example, in the 
case of trusts.167 Ensuring justiciability in such cases is mostly a 
matter of appointing a class trustee or representative. In most cases, I 
 
 164. See Carmel Shalev, China to CEDAW: An Update on Population Policy, 23 
HUM. RTS. Q. 119, 119 (2001) (“China's population policy had raised questions at 
previous reportings and continued to be of particular concern, not on a substantive 
level, but in relation to coercion in the implementation.”) 
 165. See Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Pre-
session Working Group, List of Issues and questions with regard to the 
consideration of periodic reports: China, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CHN/Q/6 
(Aug. 7-25, 2006) (requesting a description of the “concrete measures in place to 
ensure full adherence to the Law on Population and Family Planning of 2001”); 
Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding 
Comments of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: 
China, ¶¶ 17, 32, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CHN/CO/6 (Aug. 7-25, 2006) (urging 
China to take measures to verify that its family planning policies are being 
implemented in a lawful manner). 
 166. See Meyer, supra note 71, § 3.2. 
 167. See Storrow, supra note 48, at 2309. Storrow observes that, 
[i]n a little-discussed area of the law in which the best interests of the 
unconceived are of paramount concern, trust law doctrine prohibits the living 
beneficiaries of a trust to invade the trust's corpus after the settlor has died 
unless it would be in the best interests of the unborn or unascertained 
beneficiaries of the trust. 
Id. Storrow also explores the concept of “virtual representation,” whereby the 
living beneficiaries of a trust may represent the interests of unconceived 
beneficiaries to the extent that their interests are “sufficiently similar.” Id. 
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assume the state would play that role, similar to the modified role of 
parens patriae it plays in cases involving temporary “no procreation” 
orders and to the role it theoretically could play (via local family 
planning officials) in more comprehensive legislation like China’s 
family planning regime, with its system of court-enforceable and 
externality-shifting “social compensation fees” for children born out 
of quota. 
As when U.S. courts issue temporary “no procreation” orders, 
states might choose to implement parents’ obligations to prospective 
children so that (as a purely practical matter) they only engage after 
the parent has failed to fulfill or protect the CRC rights of one of his 
or her existing children. Under such an approach, (1) the state would 
already have exercised relevant jurisdiction over the parent(s) at 
issue, (2) the parent(s) would already have had a child, which at least 
according to some views of the procreative right, would make 
limiting that right more feasible, and (3) the existing child has the 
opportunity to assert a claim that he/she has rights at stake in 
whatever limited resources are at issue that prevent those resources 
from being further divided. Moreover, in this scenario, the CRC 
standards can be implemented by treating the prospective procreative 
parent as a prospective adoptive parent and applying the same 
justiciable standards.  
If this response seems rather far-fetched (aside from the fact that 
the requisite institutional structure is not in place in many of the 
states parties to which these arguments might apply), it is because the 
whole counterargument of nonjusticiability is mistimed. It gets us far 
ahead of ourselves because there is currently no sense, in 
international human rights discourse, of CRC obligations towards 
prospective children. As noted in the Introduction, this article 
focuses on why, not how, we should account for obligations to 
prospective children. We cannot implement a norm that does not 
exist or that we have not agreed should exist.  
That said, there are concrete steps that could be taken to begin to 
create the norm. The Committee could take up the issue in one of its 
general comments, specifying that Article 24(2)(f) should be read to 
require states parties to take appropriate measures to “develop 
preventive health care, guidance for parents and family planning 
DILLARD_AUTHOR CHECK 2 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/2010 5:51 PM 
2010] PROSPECTIVE PARENTS 527 
education and services”168 based on the assumption that prospective 
children deserve the standards called for by the CRC. The issue 
could also be taken up at the next U.N. International Conference on 
Population,169 where, traditionally, international human rights norms 
regarding procreation have been hammered out, and from which a 
binding treaty on population growth and reproductive health may 
eventually arise. The norms developed at the next conference could 
incorporate reference to the CRC and call on states to promote the 
rights of prospective children.  
More realistically, and even absent any international cooperation, 
CRC states parties could simply choose to promote the CRC as a 
standard prospective parents should strive to meet and engage in a 
variety of norm-changing “offensives”170 to protect the rights of 
prospective children, using the states’ public education and 
consensus-signaling functions to achieve change. They could also 
implement changes in domestic legislation regulating the family, 
taxes, reproductive health, housing, welfare, and property, among 
others, to promote the CRC objectives. As alluded to above, though 
little has been written of late, the influence of law on fertility rates 
was thoroughly studied and vast norm changes were actually 
implemented decades ago when fears of overpopulation took on 
Malthusian proportions. That work171 could be expanded upon and 
further implemented using the CRC as a benchmark. Law can change 
norms in the absence of coercion and perhaps must operate that way 
when it comes to seemingly intimate matters.172 Even implementing a 
nominal  compensation fee  scheme  could,  in  theory,  begin to shift 
 
 
 168. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1, art. 24(2)(f). 
 169. See, e.g., Report of the International Conference on Population and 
Development, Cairo, Egypt, Sept. 5-13, 1994, ch. VII, ¶ 7.3, U.N. Doc 
A/CONF.171/13. 
 170. See VERHELLEN, supra note 7, at 146 (asserting that the the CRC embodies 
an “offensive approach” through which states must actively promote children’s 
rights against infringement). 
 171. For a wonderful summary of some of that work see generally POPULATION 
AND LAW: A STUDY OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN POPULATION PROBLEMS AND 
LAW (Luke T. Lee & Arthur Larson eds., 1971). 
 172. See generally JEAN L. COHEN, REGULATING INTIMACY: A NEW LEGAL 
PARADIGM (2002) (discussing various legal regimes that have altered cultural 
norms concerning intimate matters, including reproductive rights, sexual 
orientation, and sexual harassment). 
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cultural tendencies toward considering the welfare of children before 
they are born.  
Finally, perhaps the best counterargument against reading the 
CRC in the way I suggest is that doing so would conflict with CRC 
Article 2 (as well as various other human rights conventions), in that 
a prospective parent’s right to procreate would often hinge on his or 
her property, disability, birth, or other status. Whether or not policies 
targeted a particular class of people, the simple implementation of 
CRC standards in this way might have disproportionately prejudicial 
effects.173 There are several legal responses to this point, depending 
on the particular type of discrimination alleged. The best response is 
that each state party has a duty to prevent de facto discrimination by 
reallocating resources among its citizens, regardless of whether the 
CRC applies to existing or prospective children. Both classes of 
children require resources, and if parents are lacking them, the CRC 
obligates the state to assist them. While the prospective-child 
approach, even after resource reallocation, would shift some of the 
prejudicial burden from children’s rights onto prospective parents’ 
procreative rights, that would not be inconsistent with the purposes 
of the CRC. 
Perhaps the greater concern is not the inequality within individual 
states parties as much as between states parties and the possibility 
that using the CRC as a threshold would simply ensure greater 
fertility rates in wealthy nations. As with discriminatory effects 
within particular States Parties, the tension here is between, on the 
one hand, the need to mitigate those effects and, on the other hand, 
the danger of simply relativizing and rendering the CRC as 
meaningless. One could make use of Ronald Green’s argument that 
the threshold should be thought of as the child’s national birth 
cohort,174 which would soften international discriminatory effects. 
There is also of course the question of international redistributive 
justice and the obligations states parties have to the prospective 
children  that  will  come  to  exist  in other states. Regardless of how 
 
 
 173. C.f. D.H. & Others v. Czech Republic, App. No. 57325/00, 43 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 923 (2006) (discussing de facto discrimination in the context of domestic 
education requirements). 
 174. Coleman, supra note 47, at 53. 
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they are addressed, the discriminatory effects question poses a 
challenge for this reading of the CRC. 
CONCLUSION  
If none of the reasons above seem to compel reading the CRC as 
placing obligations on prospective parents, one other reason might. 
Reams have been written of late regarding the failure of the United 
States to ratify the CRC. And while a new U.S. presidential 
administration and changes in Congress may mean that ratification 
will soon occur, the “positive rights” nature of the treaty remains an 
enduring objection to ratification.175 Reading the CRC in the way that 
I propose would, to some degree, address that objection, by taking a 
more nuanced view of rights as intricately bound up with correlative 
duties.  
If we read the CRC as protecting the rights of prospective children 
by placing some obligations on their would-be parents, we are left in 
the rather incongruous position of almost pretending that we cannot 
anticipate and prevent Convention violations, when in fact we can. It 
would be better to admit that we have chosen to elevate, prioritize, 
and orient our reading of the CRC around some value other than 
child welfare, such as procreative freedom. However, in the end, that 
would do little to serve the millions of children that will be born into 
the conditions the Convention seeks to eradicate. 
 
 
 175. See generally David M. Smolin, Overcoming Religious Objections to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 81 (2006) 
(observing that some religious groups in the United States have strong objections 
to the CRC because of a general concern that many of the rights afforded to 
children under the Convention have the effect of significantly undermining 
parental rights and impermissibly intruding upon the family). 
 
